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1. Introduction 
"One man’s patent is another man’s anticompetitive practice” was submitted by Peter 
Jennings to the intellectual property blog IP Kat’s contest of intellectual property 
proverbs.1 Even though this was done jokingly and not in a professional capacity, 
there is some truth in the proverb’s paraphrasing. The relationship between 
intellectual property and competition law has been complex and is ever complicating 
due to fact that the scope of intellectual property is widening. 
The starting point of the thesis is the well-known fact that competition law and 
intellectual property law have the same objectives. Mario Monti, the European 
Commissioner for competition policy, stressed that competition policy is looking to 
enlarge consumer welfare and to encourage innovation in his 2004 speech.2 
However, the methods used by the systems are rather different. Whilst intellectual 
property law encourages monopolies, competition law is looking to curtail them and 
pose limits to the extent of market power the players are able to use. 
This thesis is focused on the overlap between patents and trademarks and the 
possible implications this has on the competition. 
1.1. Purpose 
The purpose of the thesis is to analyse if there is a possibility to register once patent-
protected technology with a trademark and where such a possibility would stem from. 
Furthermore, the thesis aims to analyse if such a registration in itself can give rise to 
competition concerns or if the use of a trademark that comprises of an essentially 
patent-protected matter amounts to a competition law infringement. 
1.2. Method and material 
This thesis focuses on the overlap between patent and trademark law and if such 
overlaps can constitute competition law violations. Thus, the thesis touches upon 
trademark and competition law from the European perspective. 
                                                          
1
 Jeremy Phillips, IP proverbs competition: the winner! (IPKat, 17.01.2010) available at 
http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2010/01/ip-proverbs-competition-winner.html (28.04.2015). 
2
 Mario Monti, The New EU Policy on Technology Transfer Agreements (Speech held at Ecole des 
Mines, Paris, 16.01.2004) available at:http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-04-
19_en.htm?locale=en (28.04.2015). 
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This thesis uses a traditional (dogmatic) method to interpret and systemize the 
relevant sources of law and legal doctrine. The analysis is carried out firstly to 
establish the present legal framework, including references to relevant case-law. 
After concluding on the legislative framework, the analysis turns to the relevant case 
law. On 25 November 2014, the GC delivered its judgement in Simba Toys3, 
concerning the registrability of the Rubik’s Cube, in which the GC reached a contrary 
conclusion than in the now-famous Lego4 and Philips5 cases. The case law analysis 
focuses on the question if the Simba Toys ruling allows for a wider possibility of 
overlap. Lastly, the very recent Yoshida6 case is presented and the possible effects 
of this case on the Simba Toys outcome are explored. 
Secondly, the possible competition law infringements the possibility to register 
patent-protected subject matter as trademarks raises, are analysed. To carry out the 
analysis about the possible competition concerns, the dichotomies and theories 
prevalent in competition law are presented. The relevant case law from the ECJ, the 
legislative materials, articles and competition law textbooks are used to conduct the 
analysis. 
Since the ECJ has established a dichotomy between the exercise and the existence 
of IPR:s, first, the possibility of the registration in itself constituting a competition law 
violation is explored. Later, the use of the trademark amounting to a competition law 
infringement is analysed. Since competition law provisions are vague, the ECJ’s case 
law and the definitions established therein are used to conduct the analysis. The 
different concepts of competition law are further explained by the definitions offered 
by textbooks. 
The questions the thesis is looking to answer concern both the overlap and the 
competition law infringement possibilities. The first question to be answered is the 
possible implications holding up the Simba Toys ruling has. Will upholding the ruling 
mean a wider possibility for an overlap? The research questions for the second part 
of the thesis concerning competition law are concerned with the possibility of the 
registration of a patent-protected subject-matter constituting an infringement. Firstly, 
                                                          
3
 Case T-450/09 Simba Toys v OHIM [General Court, 25 November 2014]. 
4
 Case C-48/09 P Lego Juris v OHIM [2010] ECR I-08403. 
5
 Case C-299/99 Philips [2002] ECR I-05475. 
6
 Joined Cases T-331/10 RENV and T-416/10 RENV Yoshida Metal Industry v OHIM [General Court, 
21 May 2015]. 
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is the dichotomy between the existence and exercise of IPR:s meaningful? Can the 
registration of patent-protected subject matter as a trademark be a violation of 
competition law? Does the registration of patented inventions as trademarks lead to 
the proprietor’s infringing behaviour? 
1.3. Delimitations 
This thesis will only encompass the possibility to register patented subject matter as 
a trademark. Overlaps with utility model and design registrations are not touched 
upon. IPR:s are more and more harmonised in the European Union. The overlap 
between patents and trademarks is chosen due to its non-obviousness which 
provides for a more interesting analysis. Another factor which contributes to the 
choice of trademarks and patents is the fact that trademark system is already 
harmonised and the patents are soon to be harmonised. Even without the European 
patent, there is the TRIPS Agreement7 and the European Patent Convention (EPC or 
Convention)8 which allow for a common understanding of patent law across Europe. 
Furthermore, the fact that sets trademarks and patents apart is the central decision 
making and judicial procedure – the OHIM and the European Patent Office and the 
soon-to-be Unitary Patent Court.9 With some reservations, one can talk about a 
unified understanding of patent law. 
The possible competition law infringements are only explored from article 102 TFEU 
perspective.10 TFEU presents three main possibilities of distorting competition. Article 
101 TFEU is concerned with multilateral agreements which distort competition.11 The 
possible agreements the proprietor concludes are not in the scope of this thesis. 
Article 106 TFEU prohibits the disruption of competition by the State12. Since the 
thesis is not concerned with the intervention of the state, these possible 
infringements are not explored. 
                                                          
7
 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS Agreement). 
8
 European Patent Convention (EPC). 
9
 The Unified Patent Court will be established on the basis of the Agreement on the Unified Patent 
Court (draft available at http://www.unified-patent-court.org/images/documents/upc-agreement.pdf 
(24.05.2015). 
10
 Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [TFEU] Consolidated Version 
(OJ 2012 C 326/88102). 
11
 TFEU (n 10) art 101. 
12
 TFEU (n 10) art 106. 
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Mergers as a possible threat to competition are not explicitly mentioned in the TFEU. 
However, article 3 of the TFEU prescribes the possibility to rules which enable to 
guarantee effective competition. Mergers are regulated in the Merger Regulation13 
but are not analysed in this thesis due to the fact that mergers require multilateral 
conduct. 
The unfair competition can also be seen from a consumer’s perspective. This thesis 
is not concerned with the meaning of fair competition from a consumer’s point of 
view. The consumer perspective is mostly concerned with confusing the consumer 
and the consumer’s suffering, however, the abuses which are deemed to be 
detrimental to the competition are in the end detrimental to the consumer as well. 
Furthermore, the basis of unfair competition from the consumer’s perspective is the 
confusion but the registration of the patented subject-matter as a trademark does not 
lead to confusion. On the contrary, the registration guarantees that the products are 
from the same origin. However, the consumer perspective should not be disregarded 
as a whole but is simply not addressed in this thesis. 
1.4. Outline 
The thesis proceeds as follows. The first part of the thesis analyses if and to what 
extent there is an overlap in patent and trademark law. Firstly, the legislative 
framework of trademarks and patents is presented. This cannot be avoided if one 
wants to grasp where the possibility of such multiple registration lies. 
Following that, the relevant case law of the ECJ is presented and analysed. The case 
law is not excessive and thus every case is presented and analysed in great detail. 
The analysis encompasses comparison to the existing case law and the possible 
implications of upholding or overturning the Simba Toys decision on appeal. 
The second part of the thesis turns to competition law. Competition law infringements 
are interesting to explore since the ECJ has held that in case of registering functional 
shapes, the effective competition is impaired.14 If the legislation allows for a 
registration possibility, it is likely that registration of a patented subject-matter as a 
trademark occurs in practice as well. First, the overall framework and the theories 
                                                          
13
 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (OJ L 024 , 29/01/2004). 
14
 C-299/99 (n 5), para 79. 
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about competition law infringements are presented. Later the analysis turns to 
whether the registration in itself constitutes abuse of a dominant position or if the 
conduct of the proprietor amounts to a violation. Finally, the conclusions are 
presented and the main findings are summarized. 
2. Theoretical and practical possibility of registering 
patented subject matter as a trademark 
2.1. Legislative framework 
The EU has established a system of Community15 trademarks and central 
governance thereof by the Trademark Regulation.16 Trademark legislation in the 
Member States is also harmonized by the Trademark Directive.17 Furthermore, the 
EU is also a signatory to the TRIPS Agreement,18 thus the provisions of this 
agreement also apply.19 Besides the EU, all the Member States of the Union are also 
signatories to the TRIPS agreement, most of them having ratified the TRIPS 
Agreement before joining the Union. 
When it comes to patents, the legislative framework is not as clear. The EU has tried 
during almost all of its existence to create a unified patent system. This has been met 
by many hurdles and has eventually led to moving away from the harmonisation into 
a voluntary system.20 The EU has established a unitary patent system by enacting 
two regulations and concluding an international agreement among Member States 
setting up a single and specialised patent jurisdiction.21 
                                                          
15
 After coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the system should be called a Union system (author’s 
note). 
16
 Council Regulation (EC) no 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark OJ L 78/1 
(Trademark Regulation). 
17
 Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to 
approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade mark OJ L 299/5 (Trademark Directive). 
18
 List of signatories to the TRIPS Agreement, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/parties.jsp?treaty_id=231&group_id=22 (28.04.2015) 
19
 List of signatories to the TRIPS Agreement (n 18). 
20
 Hanns Ullrich, Harmonizing Patent Law: The Untamable Union Patent (Harmonisation of european 
IP law: from European rules to Belgian law and practice, M.-Chr. Janssens, G. Van Overwalle, eds., 
Brussels (Bruylant) 2012, Forthcoming; Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property & Competition 
Law Research Paper No. 12-03), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2027920, pg 5-8, 18. 
21
 The system comprises of Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 17 December 2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of 
unitary patent protection (OJ L 361), Council Regulation (EU) No 1260/2012 of 17 December 2012 
implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection with regard 
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However, the unitary patent system is not in force yet since not enough Member 
States have ratified the agreement, only six countries having done so this far. 
Furthermore, for the unitary patent system to enter into force, France, Germany and 
the UK need to be among the ones who have ratified the agreement. Thus far only 
France has done so.22 Consequentially, it might take a lot of time before the system 
enters into force. Additionally, joining the system is voluntary, so some Member 
States might not join the system at all. Hence, there might not be a European patent 
with unitary effect in the end. 
Furthermore, establishing the system has met opposition from the ECJ. The ECJ 
gave an opinion declaring the Unified Patent Court incompatible with EU law.23 In 
accordance with article 218 TFEU, this will have to lead to amending the agreement.  
One of the strongest opponents to the system has been Spain, which has filed an 
action of annulment for both of the regulations. The AG opinions in both cases do not 
see a reason to declare the regulations invalid.24 ECJ followed the AG’s opinion so 
Spain, the fiercest fighter against the unified patent system, has exhausted all their 
options.25 Furthermore, after the ECJ had declared the regulations compatible with 
EU law, Italy has been said to contemplate joining the system as well, despite their 
initial reluctance.26 
There have been other attempts by the EU to enforce common patent law but these 
have been to no avail.27 Concluding, it can be said that there is no EU patent 
legislation in force but this does not mean that there is no unity in the field of patent 
law. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
to the applicable translation arrangements (OJ L 361) and the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court 
(draft available at http://www.unified-patent-court.org/images/documents/upc-agreement.pdf 
(04.05.2015). 
22
 List of the Member States and their ratification: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-
publications/agreements-conventions/agreement/?aid=2013001 (28.04.2015) 
23
 Opinion of the Court (Full Court) 1/09 [2011] ECR I-01137 
24
 Case C-146/13 Spain v Parliament and Council [n.y.r], Opinion of AG Bot and Case C-147/13 Spain 
v Council [n.y.r], Opinion of AG Bot. 
25
 See: Case C-146/13 Spain v Parliament and Council [n.y.r] and Case C-147/13 Spain v Council 
[n.y.r]. 
26
 See: “Italy wants to join the Unitary Patent” (Kluwer Patent Blog, 14.05.2015) available at: 
http://kluwerpatentblog.com/2015/05/14/italy-wants-to-join-the-unitary-patent/ (19.05.2015) and 
Jeremy Phillips “After Spain loses, Italy falls into line: unitary patent package edges closer” (IPKat, 
15.05.2015), available at: http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2015/05/after-spain-loses-italy-falls-into-line.html 
(19.05.2015). 
27
 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the patentability of 
computer-implemented inventions (Commission proposal COM(2002) 92) OJ C 151E. 
12 
 
The TRIPS Agreement includes provisions on all types of IPR:s, including  patents, 
thus one could even say that since the EU is a signatory, there is no need for EU 
patent law since a common basis for national patent law already exists. It must be 
noted, though, that the TRIPS Agreement leaves quite a lot of discretion to the 
signatories. Thus, even though the TRIPS Agreement is the same in every signatory 
state, the patent law does not necessarily need to be. 
In addition to the TRIPS Agreement, there is the European Patent Convention (EPC 
or Convention).28 The EU is not a signatory to the Convention but all the EU Member 
States are, most of them having joined the Convention before or simultaneously with 
joining the EU.29 Since the EPC is a lot more detailed than the TRIPS Agreement, 
this could be compared with the Trademark Regulation, allowing for a common 
understanding of patent law. The fact that the EU Member States are signatories to 
both, the TRIPS Agreement and the EPC also means that they are deprived of some 
of the discretion awarded by the TRIPS Agreement. 
However, there is still no equivalent to the Community trademark in the field of 
patents. The EPC provides for a bundle of rights in countries in which the patent 
owner wishes to protect the invention. This could mean all countries of the EU but the 
substance of the rights is still up for national law to furnish.30 
In conclusion, there is not a unified European patent law just yet. Considering that all 
the Member States are signatories to the TRIPS and EPC and the possibility of 
actually establishing a European Patent, there still needs to be a common 
understanding of patent law and thus, the comparison can be conducted from a 
European perspective. Since the harmonisation provided for by the EPC can be 
compared to the one provided for by the Trademark Regulation which in turn has 
essentially the same scope as the Trademark Directive, references are made to 
these rules throughout most of the comparison. 
                                                          
28
 EPC (n 8). 
29
 Member states of the European Patent Organisation, available at http://www.epo.org/about-
us/organisation/member-states.html (04.05.2015). 
30
 Ullrich (n 20), pg 5-8. 
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2.1.1. Protectable subject matter 
According to the TRIPS agreement article 15(1), any sign, or any combination of 
signs, capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those 
of other undertakings, shall be capable of constituting a trademark. The article lists 
words including personal names, letters, numerals, figurative elements and 
combinations of colours and any combination of the aforementioned as eligible for 
trademark registration.31 The Trademark Directive article 2 and Trademark 
Regulation article 4 add to the list by explicitly mentioning designs, the shape of 
goods or their packaging.32 
The TRIPS Agreement article 27(1) sets the conditions for patentable subject matter. 
Accordingly, patents are available for any inventions, whether for products or 
processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive 
step and are capable of industrial application. The Convention article 52(1) has the 
same wording. Both definitions of protectable subject matter are rather broad so it is 
not possible to draw any conclusions from just these provisions. 
When it comes to the overlap, the TRIPS Agreement does not exclude shapes 
essentially dictated by their function from trademark protection, which is a bit 
surprising. Therefore, functional shapes which are distinctive, new, inventive and 
capable of industrial application could benefit from the double protection of trademark 
and patent laws under the TRIPS Agreement.33 The Trademark Directive and the 
Trademark Regulation both allow overlaps and the EPC does not take a stand on the 
possible overlaps. Thus, the overlap is possible.34 
Both patent and trademark legislation lay down some boundaries as to how far the 
protectable subject matter reaches. The TRIPS Agreement articles 27(2) and 27(3) 
give the signatory states the possibility to exclude some categories of inventions from 
being patented but does not prescribe anything to be definitely excluded. The EPC 
article 52(2) excludes discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods, 
aesthetic creations, schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing 
games or doing business, and programs for computers and presentations of 
                                                          
31
 TRIPS Agreement (n 7), art 15. 
32
 Trade Mark Directive (n 17), art 2, Trademark Regulation (n 16) art 4. 
33
 Estelle Derclaye, Matthias Leistner, Intellectual Property Overlaps A European Perspective ((Hart 
Publishing 2011), pg 15. 
34
 Derclaye, Leistner (n 33), pg 84. 
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information from patent protection. These categories are excluded from patent 
protection since an invention must be of a technical nature and these are not.35 The 
EU Member States need to exclude these categories from being patented since they 
are signatories to both, the TRIPS Agreement and the EPC. 
Furthermore, the EPC article 53 does not allow inventions the commercial 
exploitation of which would be contrary to public order or morality, plant or animal 
varieties or essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals 
and methods for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy and 
diagnostic methods practised on the human or animal body to be patented. The 
rationale behind these exclusions is that there is a different protection available36 or 
that this area should be kept free from patents.37 Once more, the TRIPS Agreement 
article 27(3) leaves it in the discretion of the signatory, but, yet again, the EU Member 
States do not have the discretion. 
The Trademark Directive does not enlist any categories of what cannot be protected 
but protection of public order and morality is also a ground for refusal.38 The same 
grounds for refusal are also stated in Trademark Regulation article 7(1)(f). However, 
the difference between trademark and patent law seems to be that in patent law it is 
only a proactive evaluation but in trademark law the finding of a mark being against 
public morality can occur retroactively as well since the Trademark Directive is 
worded as “shall not be registered or if registered, be declared invalid”.39 For patents, 
the legislation excludes the subject matter which is contrary to public morality from 
being protected but does not foresee a possibility of losing the protection once 
gained. 
I think that the proactive and retroactive invalidation possibilities are intentional. 
Since the patent applications are scrutinised to a greater extent, all the patents which 
are contrary to public order or morals, should be detected in the application process. 
Trademarks, on the other hand, are used over a prolonged period of time, thus they 
                                                          
 
35
 Ian Muir, Matthias Brandi-Dohrn, Stephan Gruber, European Patent Law. Law and Procedure 
under the EPC and PCT 2
nd
 edition (Oxford University Press 2002), 12.02. 
36
 There is the possibility to cover plant varieties with the protection awarded by the International 
Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) and the general understanding is that if the 
UPOV is available, a patent should not be. See: Muir, Brandi-Dohm, Gruber (n 35), 12.15 
37
 Muir, Brandi-Dohm, Gruber (n 35), 12.22. 
38
 Trade Mark Directive (n 17), art 3(1). 
39
 Trade Mark Directive (n 17), art 3(1). 
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might become contrary to public morals or order during their lifespan. This is why I 
think it is important to have the possibility to declare a trademark invalid on these 
grounds retroactively as well. 
In conclusion, it is clear that there is an overlap in the protectable subject matter. 
Next, the analysis turns to the registration conditions and the scope of protection 
awarded. 
2.1.2. Registration conditions 
The conditions for a patent registration as set forth in the TRIPS Agreement article 
27(1) are not numerous. In order to register a patent, article 27(1) TRIPS Agreement 
list that the invention must be new, involve an inventive step and be capable of 
industrial application. The EPC article 52(1) sets out the same conditions. 
The TRIPS Agreement does not go into detail regarding the conditions but the EPC 
does provide some definition. Accordingly, an invention is new if it does not form a 
part of the state of the art.40 The state of the art comprises of everything made 
available to the public by means of a written or oral description, by use, or in any 
other way.41 The European Patent Office (EPO) has specified that disclosing the 
information to even one person who does not have to maintain the secrecy of the 
information, means disclosure to the public and thus losing the possibility to file for a 
patent.42 By disclosing the invention, it becomes a part of state of the art and thus 
incapable of being patented. 
Thus, an invention needs to be undisclosed before the patent application. The extent 
of the novelty and not being state of the art is a case-by-case analysis and this 
explains why patent applications take a long time to be processed.43 
Involvement of an inventive step, in the meaning of the EPC means that the invention 
is not obvious to a person skilled in the art, taking into consideration the state of the 
art.44 EPO is using the problem-solution approach to evaluate the involvement of an 
                                                          
40
 EPC (n 8), art 54(1). 
41
 EPC (n 8), art 54(2). 
42
 Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office, Decision T 1081/01 27.09.2004, reasons 5. 
43
 According to EPO’s FAQ:s, a European patent grant procedure takes about three to five years from 
the date of filing of the application. See: http://www.epo.org/service-support/faq/own-file.html#faq-274 
(26.05.2015) 
44
 EPC (n 8), art 56. 
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inventive step.45 The inventive step is a rather subjective criterion and it can be 
difficult to assess. This is another criterion which prolongs the patent grant 
procedure. 
Lastly, the invention needs to be capable of industrial application, meaning that it 
must be capable of being made or used in any kind of industry, including 
agriculture.46 The EPO has furnished this criterion as meaning that in addition to the 
possibility to make the invention in some way; it also needs to be used in a profitable 
way.47 I think that this is a limitation to the patented subject-matter since it means that 
not every invention can be patented, only the ones that are useful or have some 
demand to them, are afforded patent protection. 
There is no requirement of novelty in trademark law. On the contrary, the Trademark 
Directive, the TRIPS Agreement and the Paris Convention48 foresee a possibility of 
registering a mark which would not be registered otherwise, to gain protection if it has 
been used and has fulfilled the otherwise lacking conditions for registration through 
use.49 Due to the fact that there is no requirement of novelty for trademarks, a once 
used but forgotten trademark can be registered again. The same does not hold true 
for patent protection, this can only be obtained once. However, I admit that novel 
trademarks might earn protection easier than trademarks which are not that 
inventive. I am of the opinion that even though the novelty helps in obtaining 
trademark protection, it is still impossible to call it a requirement. 
Another very specific condition to registering a trademark is the ability of being 
visually perceived. According to article 15(2) of the TRIPS Agreement, trademarks 
might have the additional condition of being visually perceptible. However, the EU 
countries are not free in this regard since the Trademark Directive prescribes the 
necessity of a trademark being graphically represented.50 
There is no requirement for a patented technology to be visually perceived. This is 
understandable since it is very difficult, if not impossible to represent a process 
graphically. However, the EPC does require a degree of disclosure in a manner 
                                                          
45
 Established in Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office, Decision T 0024/81 13.10.1982. 
46
 EPC (n 8), art 57. 
47
 Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office, Decision T 0870/04 11.05.2005. 
48
 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883. [Paris Convention]. 
49
 TRIPS Agreement (n 7), art 16(1). 
50
 Trade Mark Directive (n 17), art 2. 
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sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art.51 
The sufficiently clear and complete manner might involve pictures and drawings52 but 
there is no definite necessity of visual perception.  
Due to the necessity of a trademark being graphically representable, it seems nearly 
impossible to trademark a process since it is very difficult to represent the process 
graphically and still end up with a mark and not something that resembles an 
instruction or a comic strip. Though, I admit that series of images might be protected 
by trademark. However, to me, it seems uncommon and not very likely to happen to 
a patented process due to the other conditions set for a trademark to be eligible for 
registration. 
The possibility of protecting a process with a trademark might become a bit more 
realistic in the future. The requirement of being graphically represented has led to 
different practices and confusion as to what it means.53 In the preparatory works for 
the new Trademark Directive, the requirement of being represented graphically has 
been replaced by the requirement of being represented in a manner which enables 
the competent authorities and the public to determine the precise subject of the 
protection afforded to its proprietor.54 The exact scope and meaning of the provision 
is yet to be determined. Most likely, registering olfactory and tactile marks becomes 
easier. Despite the fact of losing the graphic representation requirement, it is unlikely 
that processes will be trademarked and the overlap between trademarks and 
patented subject matter will not widen. 
Due to the requirement of graphical representation, the overlap between protectable 
subject matter in case of trademark and patent law lies mostly in the product patents. 
I do not find the requirement of being graphically represented to be an obstacle to 
registering product patents as trademarks. In case of a product patent, the whole 
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product, including its shape is protected by the patent. Since shapes of products can 
be registered as trademarks, this opens up the possibility of multiple registrations. 
In case of trademarks, there are no listings what actually will be registered as a 
trademark, there are just categories which will not be registered as a trademark as 
set forth in the Trademark Directive. The TRIPS Agreement does not specify any 
conditions to registrability. The Trademark Directive and the Trademark Regulation 
on the other hand do.55 Firstly, signs which cannot constitute a trademark will not be 
registered.56 This mostly rules out registering matter protected by a process patent 
from trademark registration. Secondly, trademarks which are devoid of distinctive 
character will not be registered.57 However, the lack of distinctiveness is not an 
absolute ground for refusal. The ECJ has found on several occasions that the lack of 
distinctiveness can be overcome by use.58 I find that the lack of distinctiveness 
should not be a problem in case of a patent-protected subject matter. Since the 
patent protection requires novelty and an inventive step, it is highly likely that the 
distinctiveness criterion is also fulfilled. 
Trademarks which consist exclusively of signs and indications about the 
characteristics of the goods or services and marks which exclusively consist of signs 
and indications which have become customary in the language will also not be 
registered.59 I find this ground for refusal also not applicable since degeneration is 
mostly a concern for words and words cannot be patented. I do acknowledge that 
degeneration can also happen for other types of mark but consider it unlikely. 
Concerning the shape marks, there is a specific ground for refusal. Trademarks 
which consist exclusively of the shape which results from the nature of the goods, the 
shape of goods which is necessary to obtain a technical result and the shape which 
gives substantial value to the goods, will not be registered.60 This is the grounds 
which should exclude patented subject matter from being protected by trademarks. 
Some authors have found that this provision has almost completely removed the 
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overlap.61 However, the keyword is exclusively, meaning that design and artistic 
elements, also including other elements in the trademark, signifies a possibility for 
registration. I am of the opinion that since it does not rule out functional shapes 
completely, there is still an overlap and thus the registration is possible. 
Furthermore, trademarks which are of a nature to deceive the public shall also be 
declined registration.62 This is due to the purpose of trademarks- to distinguish 
products from others.63 This absolute ground for refusal is extremely important from 
the unfair competition perspective. In conclusion, it can be said that most absolute 
grounds for refusal to register a trademark do not influence the possibility to register 
a patent-protected subject matter as a trademark. The most relevant absolute ground 
for refusal is the non-registrability of shapes which are necessary to obtain a 
technical result. 
2.1.3. Requirement of use 
There is no explicit requirement of use for patents; it seems that the only condition to 
keep the patent is the payment of the renewal fees.64 However, under certain 
conditions, the patent can be subject to a compulsory license. Article 31 of the TRIPS 
Agreement foresees the conditions for compulsory licensing.65 One of the conditions 
is that the licensee has not been able to obtain a license under commercial terms.66 
The Paris Convention which all the EU Member States are signatories,67 prescribes 
that a compulsory license may not be filed for before four years from the date of filing 
of the patent application or three years from the date of the grant of the patent have 
elapsed if the license is filed for on the grounds of not working or insufficient 
working.68 Thus, there is an implicit requirement of use. I do not think that in the case 
of registering patented subject matter as trademarks, the requirement of use is 
relevant since compulsory licenses are to be granted only under specific conditions, I 
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do not see how a patent-protected subject matter which is later trademarked can fulfil 
these criteria. However, on a general level, I do think that there is a requirement of 
use, albeit implicit, for patents. 
In case of trademarks, the obligation to use the mark is explicit. The TRIPS 
Agreement does not impose an obligation of use but leaves it up to the signatory 
parties and establishes it as a possible precondition.69 Yet again, the Trademark 
Directive deprives the Member States of the possibility of discretion and establishes 
that a trademark may be lost if not used. If the trademark is not used during a period 
of five consecutive years, the trademark can be revoked.70 
Furthermore, the use of the trademark must be genuine, which, as established by 
ECJ means that the mark is used in accordance with its essential function, which is to 
guarantee the identity of the origin of the goods or services for which it is registered, 
in order to create or preserve an outlet for those goods or services. Genuine use 
does not include token use for the sole purpose of preserving the rights conferred by 
the mark.71 However, licensing and use by licensees does constitute genuine use.72 
The use by the licensees can be considered genuine since the licensees have had to 
obtain the consent beforehand. Furthermore, the trademark proprietor sets the 
license conditions and thereby the conditions under which the trademark is used. I 
am of the opinion that if the trademark owner licenses the mark, they are looking for 
putting the trademark into use and not just keeping it; otherwise the proprietor would 
not even look into licensing the mark. 
The requirement of use sets trademarks apart from all other types of intellectual 
property. The requirement of use might be explained by the fact that trademarks are 
the only intellectual property rights whose validity can be perpetual.73 The obligation 
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to use is established to guarantee sufficient availability of trademarks and to avoid 
unfair monopolies on trademarks. For a patent owner looking to protect the patented 
subject matter with a trademark, this signifies an obligation to use. 
2.1.4. Duration of protection 
The duration of protection differs greatly for trademarks and patents. According to the 
TRIPS Agreement article 18, a trademark shall have the initial protection of at least 
seven years and can be prolonged indefinitely; the term of renewal shall also be at 
least seven years. The duration of patent protection, is, stemming from article 33 of 
the TRIPS Agreement, at maximum, 20 years, starting from the application’s filing 
date. The EU has adopted regulations which allow for an extra period of protection of 
five years for medicinal products74, plant protection products75 and medicinal 
products for paediatric use.76 Even with the additional protection time, the duration of 
patent protection is very limited since the protection starts from the filing date and not 
the date the product actually is made available to the public. Considering the extent 
of investments needed for a patent, the motivation to seek a form of longer protection 
is understandable. 
2.1.5. Rights conferred 
The general understanding of rights conferred by a trademark is the same in the 
Trademark Directive and in the TRIPS Agreement: a trademark gives the proprietor 
the possibility to prevent all third parties from using the trademark in the course of 
trade.77 However, the conditions of preventing use differ. According to the TRIPS 
Agreement, the prevention right only exists in case of identical or similar signs for 
goods or services which are identical or similar to the ones marketed under the 
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trademark where such use would result in a likelihood of confusion.78 Thus, under the 
TRIPS Agreement, the trademark proprietor can only prevent similar products from 
being marketed under a similar sign. 
The Trademark Directive is more lenient, allowing for prevention in case of identical 
signs without the likelihood of confusion and in case of similar signs; the likelihood of 
confusion needs to be established.79 Furthermore, the Trademark Directive also 
leaves it for the Member State to decide if the prevention right stretches to goods or 
services not identical to the ones the trademark is registered for but if the use 
tarnishes the reputation of the trademark.80 
EPC does not specify which rights a patent confers on the owner and only sets forth 
that in case of a process patent, the protection covers the products directly obtained 
by it.81 In the TRIPS Agreement, the essence of the rights conferred is the same; the 
rights are negative rights. However, the rights depend on if the patent is a product or 
a process patent. According to the TRIPS Agreement, a product patent confers on its 
owner the exclusive right to prevent third parties from making, using, offering for sale, 
selling, or importing for these purposes that product.82 A process patent gives the 
right to prevent third parties from using the process, and from using, offering for sale, 
selling, or importing for these purposes at least the product obtained directly by that 
process.83 According to the Trademark Directive, offering the goods or putting them 
on the market or stocking them for such purposes under the sign can be prohibited 
as well as importing and exporting the goods.84 
The rights conferred by a patent and a trademark are similar in such a way that they 
are both negative rights. Another similarity between the rights conferred by patents 
and trademarks is the possibility to license.85 However, in case of licensing, the 
decision whether or not to grant a license seems to rest solely with the trademark 
proprietor since article 21 of the TRIPS Agreement prohibits compulsory licensing of 
trademarks.86 The prohibition is justified by the very subject matter of trademarks. 
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The ability to distinguish one undertaking’s products from another’s is completely free 
from public interest, thus there cannot be compulsory licensing.87 However, one 
could argue that the compulsory licensing possibility serves the consumer’s interests. 
I think that this point of view finds more support in the situation where the trademark 
proprietor does not use their trademark and thus a compulsory license is granted. 
However, if the trademark proprietor uses the trademark, the compulsory licensing 
would run counter to consumer’s interest. It is in the consumer’s interest to 
distinguish one company’s products from another’s, hence in case of compulsory 
licensing, there would be a situation where two different companies would use the 
same mark. This could result in confusion for the consumer. Furthermore, I think that 
this would lead to the loss of the trademark’s essential function of distinguishing the 
products. 
However, the compulsory licensing of trademarks is not completely ruled out. Article 
40 of the TRIPS Agreement reserves the States the possibility to specify conditions 
which constitute abuse of intellectual property. Compulsory licensing of trademarks 
for the purpose of remedying the abuse of dominant position therefore amounts to an 
implied exception to the prohibition.88 I am of the opinion that the exception is more 
theoretical than practical. The conditions for establishing a compulsory license of a 
trademark are very exceptional and compulsory licensing of trademarks would be 
detrimental to the competitive situation and the market overall. Thus, I do not see a 
compulsory license for trademarks. 
The TRIPS Agreement foresees a possibility to grant exceptions from both patent 
and trademark protection. Article 17 sets forth that a Member State may provide 
exceptions such as fair use if legitimate interests of the owner and third parties are 
accounted for. In case of patents, the exceptions must not unreasonably conflict with 
a normal exploitation of the patent nor prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent 
owner and taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.89 Member State 
law may also provide for other uses without authorization.90 Hence, there is a 
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possibility of fair use of patents as well. However, I am not aware of any of such 
exceptions. 
2.1.6. Concluding remarks 
In conclusion, there is a possibility of overlaps in subject matter in patent law and 
trademark law. This overlap lies in the possibility to register shapes as trademarks. It 
has been said that the requirement of non-functionality removes the overlap but I do 
not share this view. I find that the overlap still exists since it is not absolute – the 
refusal to register only covers shapes which are necessary for a technical function. 
The motivation to register patented subject-matter as trademarks lies in the fact that 
trademark protection can be perpetual whilst patent protection is clearly limited in 
time and further capped by the fact that patent protection starts from the date of filing 
the application but the grant procedure can take years. I believe that it is safe to say 
that the different scopes of trademark and patent protection can be a motivation to 
seek trademark protection for a patented invention. 
2.2. The overlap in ECJ’s case law 
The possibility of overlaps in trademark and patent law is rather small as the previous 
analysis showed. It has been claimed that the requirement of a trademark not being 
functional eliminates the overlap completely.91 It is also said that a previous patent is 
practically irrefutable evidence that features therein disclosed or claimed are 
functional.92 
Since even the theoretical overlap is rather slim, there is not a vast body of case law 
on the matter. Despite that, the ECJ has had chances to rule on the issue. The 
analysis starts with the Philips case and continues on to the following Lego case. 
Later the focus is on the recent Simba Toys case and its possible outcomes. The 
Yoshida case which differs from the aforementioned in some respect but since the 
basis of the claim is the functionality of the shape, it is worth of analysis. 
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2.2.1. Philips 
The first case, where the ECJ had to deal with the subject of trademarking previously 
patented subject matter, is the Philips case.93 In 1966, Philips developed a new type 
of three-headed rotary electric shaver. The three-headed rotary shaver was patented 
as well.94 In 1985, after the patent protection had elapsed, Philips filed an application 
to register a trademark consisting of a graphic representation of the shape and 
configuration of the head of such a shaver, comprising three circular heads with 
rotating blades in the shape of an equilateral triangle. The required trademark was 
registered in the United Kingdom on the basis of use under the Trade Marks Act 
1938.95 
In 1995, Remington started marketing three-rotary headed shavers as well and 
Philips accordingly sued them for trademark infringement. Remington filed a 
counterclaim, trying to revoke Philips’s trademark.96 
In the first instance, the High Court of Justice of England and Wales allowed the 
counterclaim and revoked the registered trademark. The revocation was based on 
the trademark being incapable of distinguishing the goods and being devoid of 
distinctive character. Additionally, the court held that the mark consisted solely of a 
shape necessary to obtain a technical result. The court also held that even if the 
trademark was valid, it would not have been infringed.97 Philips appealed the 
decision to the High Court which decided to stay the proceedings and refer 
preliminary questions to the ECJ. The High Court posed seven questions to the ECJ, 
but the Court only answered four of them. The questions of interest for this thesis are 
the second, the third and the fourth questions. 
The second question asks if a shape mark is only capable of being registered when it 
includes an additional element which serves no functional purpose.98 Philips argued 
that there is a category of marks that can be shown to have acquired a distinctive 
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character, but which are nevertheless incapable of distinguishing goods.99 Remington 
favoured a more literal reading and contended that if a shape of an article has no 
additional elements, it consists solely of functional shapes which are not eligible for 
trademark registration. An additional element, according to Remington, is capable of 
indicating origin.100 
The ECJ came up with a somewhat in-between solution. The ECJ stated that the 
criteria to establish distinctiveness are the same for all types of trademarks.101 
Continuing on from that position, the ECJ concludes that there is no requirement of 
having additional non-functional elements for shape marks and the shape must 
simply be capable of carrying out the function of a trademark which is to distinguish 
the origin of the goods.102 
I must agree with the ECJ when they decided that the requirements for 
distinctiveness are the same for all trademarks and did not establish a different test 
for shape marks. If the ECJ would have decided otherwise, it would have created a 
hierarchy between trademarks. The hierarchy would be artificial and detrimental to 
the trademark system and it would result in confusion. Even though, due to the 
graphical representation requirement, olfactory, tactile and sound marks seem to 
have a higher hurdle to overcome than the more traditional kinds of trademarks, so in 
that regard it would not have been completely never-before-seen to have an 
additional requirement for some types of trademarks. However, in the light of the 
proposed legislative changes, I find that the approach of the ECJ is better than 
establishing different requirements. Since the ECJ did not establish a hierarchy, the 
Philips case remains good law and completely applicable even after doing away with 
the graphical representation requirement. 
In the third question, the referring court is asking if the shape has acquired 
distinctiveness if only one product of the shape has been on the market and the 
maker and the product have become interrelated to the consumer.103 Philips found 
that the question should be answered in the affirmative and that a de facto monopoly 
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further corroborates to such a finding.104 Remington stated that in case of a functional 
shape, strong evidence is needed to establish that the shape has been used as a 
trademark and the monopoly only makes the burden higher.105 
To me, the most reasonable argument was put forth by the United Kingdom 
government saying that the acquired distinctiveness only applies to marks which are 
capable of constituting a trademark but are only lacking distinctiveness. The 
functional shapes are not capable of constituting trademarks thus the acquired 
distinctiveness does not play a part. Even if it were applicable, the pre-existing 
monopoly does not corroborate to the acquired distinctiveness.106 Quite surprisingly, 
the Commission found a possibility of overcoming the mere functionality of a shape 
as a hindrance to trademark registration. However, to the Commission, the public’s 
opinion is of utmost importance.107 
ECJ disregarded the importance of the existence of a previous monopoly and for the 
most part, agreed with Remington.108 As to the acquired distinctiveness, the ECJ 
found that if the shape is functional, the acquired distinctiveness is irrelevant and the 
shape cannot be registered as a trademark.109 The ECJ stressed the need to conduct 
thorough surveys to establish the relevant part of the public associating the shape 
and the provider.110 By stating that the functionality of the shapes cannot be 
overcome by use, the ECJ solidified the absoluteness of the ground for refusal. 
The referring court is also looking for an answer to the question if the refusal to 
register functional shapes can be overcome if there are alternative shapes.111 Philips 
argues that in case of alternative shapes, registering one as a trademark should be 
possible.112 Remington is of the opposite opinion.113 Quite surprisingly, the 
Commission believes that the availability of alternative shapes is a factor.114 
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The ECJ established that a trademark which consist exclusively of a functional 
shape, can never acquire distinctive character through use.115 Functional shapes are 
thus incapable of constituting trademarks116. The ECJ reiterated that the registration 
possibility needs to be analysed in the light of the public interest underlying them.117 
The rationale behind the refusal to register functional shapes is prevention of 
granting a monopoly over technical solutions or functional characteristics if those are 
the ones the consumer is looking for in the product. The refusal is intended to 
prevent the everlasting protection of a trademark being extended too far. In addition 
to protecting the consumer, it also protects the competitors and competition.118 If 
such shapes were registered, effective competition would be impaired by not granting 
competitors the choice of incorporating such a function or at least limit the choice.119 
The public interest behind the refusal is that a shape whose essential characteristics 
perform a technical function and were chosen to fulfil that function may be freely 
used by all.120 The AG Colomer in his opinion stated that if the approach of 
alternative shapes being available makes it possible to register a functional shape as 
a trademark, there is nothing to stop an undertaking from registering as trademarks 
all imaginable shapes which achieved such a result, thus obtaining a permanent 
monopoly over a particular technical solution. Furthermore, an additional burden of 
assessing the different solutions would be placed on the courts adjudicating the 
trademark cases.121 
I strongly agree with the AG since taking a different position would have meant many 
practical issues and uncertainties in the field of trademark law which is already rather 
subjective. In case of a different position, there would also have been the need to 
establish a minimum of how many alternative shapes allow for registration. If there 
are only two shapes and one of them is registered and the registered shape is 
significantly more efficient or otherwise better, there would be a monopoly 
established and the consumer and the competition would suffer. Furthermore, the 
ECJ then would have had to deal with the question if the number of alternatives 
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should be the same for every shape or depend on some additional criteria. Thus, the 
disregard towards the alternatives was the better route to take. 
AG Colomer also stressed the importance of not prolonging unfairly the protection 
awarded to intellectual property.122 I think that this statement from the AG shows the 
attitude towards the overlap between different types of intellectual property. It seems 
that the AG is of the opinion that even though there is an overlap, it should not be 
used to gain an advantage since such an advantage would be unfair. The question 
still remains if the advantage can be considered unfair if it is allowed in intellectual 
property law. 
The position regarding functional shapes seems to be quite clear in this case. If a 
shape is functional, it can never be registered, even if it fulfils all the other criteria. 
Due to the fact that this is a preliminary ruling procedure and not an appeal case from 
the GC, there is nothing on how to establish the functionality or the meaning of 
functionality or the overall conclusion of the registration possibility. 
2.2.2. Lego 
The following case to Philips is the now well-known case of Lego123. Lego filed the 
application to OHIM in 1996 and after the procedure was completed, a trademark 
was registered in 1999. The trademark Lego was looking to register was the red 
Lego brick as shown in figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1 The mark for which the registration was sought 
Shortly thereafter, Lego’s competitor Mega Brands filed an application to invalidate 
the trademark. The application was based on the allegation that the trademark was 
contrary to Article 7(1)(e)(ii) of the Trademark Regulation. The Cancellation Division 
awaited the ECJ’s judgment in Philips and following that declared the trademark 
invalid in 2004.124 The Grand Board of Appeal upheld the decision.125 The Grand 
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Board of Appeal amongst other arguments based its conclusion on the existence of 
prior patents.126 Lego appealed, claiming that the Grand Board of Appeal had 
erroneously identified the essential characteristics of the shape. The GC upheld the 
decision and as a final attempt to keep the registration, Lego appealed to the ECJ. 
AG Mengozzi recommended in his opinion that Lego’s appeal should be dismissed. 
His view was that the trademark as a whole is functional. As a novelty, the AG 
proposed a three step test for cases such as this. The first stage involve establishing 
if all or only some of the essential characteristics are functional, the second step is a 
teleological step – whether or not the registration would impair competition and third 
and final stage is the evaluation of distinctiveness.127 The ECJ, however, did not 
adopt the proposed test. In a way, the ECJ did adopt the first step of the test. 
In its decision, the ECJ stated that while deciding on the different absolute grounds of 
refusal stated in article 7(1) Trademark Regulation, the public interest underlying 
each of them must be taken into account. The public interest in case of refusing 
registration for functional marks is prevention of granting a monopoly on technical 
solutions or functional characteristics. 128 This position is exactly the same the ECJ 
took in Philips. 
The objective of the refusal, according to the ECJ, is twofold. Firstly, it prevents the 
abuse of trademark law.129 In that regard, the ECJ explicitly states that the refusal is 
there to avoid the prolonging of patent rights.130 Even though the distinctiveness of 
the Lego brick was never disputed in the proceedings, thus in principle the Lego brick 
is capable of constituting a trademark.131 However, the ECJ expressly stated that the 
distinctiveness of the shape bears no relevance since a functional shape cannot be 
registered even if it has become distinctive through use.132 It seems to me that by 
ruling on the distinctiveness, the ECJ is touching upon the third step of the test 
proposed by the AG. Nevertheless, the ECJ is not calling it a three-step test and is 
merely making remarks and not analysing the matter. 
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Secondly, the refusal to register shapes which is exclusively necessary to obtain a 
technical result is justified as a guarantee that not all shapes would be denied 
registration. The ECJ contends that a shape to some extent always is functional and 
thus it is important to have the conditions of “exclusively” and “necessary”.133 
The GC had held that a sign would consist ‘exclusively’ of the shape of the goods 
which is necessary to obtain a technical result when all the essential characteristics 
of a shape perform a technical function. It is irrelevant whether or not the shape has 
non-essential characteristics which do not contribute to the technical solution.134 One 
can clearly see the influence of Philips and the GC’s willingness to state the 
principles the aforesaid had established. The ECJ had no reason to disagree with the 
GC but nuanced the approach even more; stating that the refusal does not cover 
shapes which have a major non-functional element.135 To me, this is where the 
overlap and the registration possibility lie. If the shape contains a major non-
functional element, it can still be registered. I admit, that the assessment of the major 
non-functional element might prove to be difficult. However, since the ECJ did not 
completely rule out the possibility, I cannot agree with the position that the overlap is 
eliminated. 
According to the AG’s opinion which the ECJ agreed with, the essential 
characteristics must be understood as the most important elements of the sign. The 
establishment of these is done on a case-by-case basis. 136 The evaluation of those 
must be conducted on a case by case basis and the competent authority has the 
discretion to either assess the overall impression or the components of the sign.137 
Thus the assessment is different in every case and dependent on the degree of 
difficulty. In case of a more difficult assessment, surveys, expert opinions or data may 
be taken into account.138 
Board of Appeals found that the most important element of the Lego brick sign 
consisted of the two rows of studs on the upper surface of the brick and placed 
particular emphasis on the inclusion of that element in Lego’s prior patents. Board of 
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Appeals found that the only arbitrary element in the Lego brick was the colour and 
thus the brick as a whole was found to be functional. 139 
Lego put forward the argument that the essential characteristics must be evaluated 
from the perspective of the average consumer.140 The ECJ dismissed this argument 
and concurred with the GC in its finding that the consumer’s perception is not 
decisive and can at most be a criterion of assessment.141 
Lego also put forward the argument that the registration of functional shapes should 
only be denied if it created a monopoly.142 This resembles to a great extent the 
argument put forward in Philips about the existence of alternative solutions. In 
relation to the Philips case, Lego supported its claim by stating that the ECJ in Philips 
did not clearly state that the availability of alternative shapes is irrelevant.143 
This time, the ECJ explicitly ruled that the existence of alternative shapes is of no 
relevance. The fact that there may be alternative shapes, with other dimensions or 
another design, capable of achieving the same technical result, did not of itself mean 
that registering the shape as trade mark would have no effect on the availability, to 
other economic operators, of the technical solution which it incorporates.144 The 
Board of Appeals had found that the shape of the Lego brick was the technically 
preferable solution to toy bricks and when it is registered as a trademark, it would be 
difficult to provide efficient competition.145 Thus, Lego’s position should not be 
protected under trademark law. However, the ECJ did hint on the possible 
competition law concerns but did not go into them as that was out of the scope of the 
preliminary questions.146 
The ECJ’s decision included a very strong opinion about the existence of previous 
patents.147 The ECJ held that the technical functionality may be assessed based on 
previous patents.148 This is where the ECJ drew a very clear line between patent and 
trademark law. By giving the possibility to assess functionality based on previous 
                                                          
139
 C-48/09 (n 4), paras 73-74. 
140
 C-48/09 (n 4), para 63. 
141
 C-48/09 (n 4), para 76. 
142
 C-48/09 (n 4), para 29. 
143
 C-48/09 (n 4), para 32. 
144
 C-48/09 (n 4), para 55. 
145
 C-48/09 (n 4), para 60. 
146
 C-48/09 (n 4), para 61. 
147
 C-48/09 (n 4), paras 81-85. 
148
 C-48/09 (n 4), para 85. 
33 
 
patents, ECJ is saying that patents are functional and trademarks are not and thus 
the subject matter is different. This view has also been forwarded in the literature.149  
In the Lego case, the ECJ built mostly on what they had already established in the 
Philips case. The Lego case can also be seen as a correction of mistakes made in 
the Philips case – in Lego, the ECJ explicitly ruled on the question of alternatives 
which might have been a bit overlooked in Philips. I do agree with the ECJ’s position 
of patents being functional and trademarks not being functional. I think that this is 
due to the subject matter, a patent is essentially an invention, a trademark is a mark 
and does not have to be useful in the same way an invention is. The next case 
analysis will show that in reality, the question of functionality is not so straightforward. 
2.2.3. Simba Toys 
A very different approach from the one taken in Philips and Lego was taken by the 
GC in the recent Simba Toys case. On 1 April 1996, Seven Towns Ltd filed for a 
registration at the OHIM. The mark, towards which the registration was sought, was a 
three dimensional mark depicting a Rubik’s cube, without involving any colours. The 
graphic representation of the mark is shown below in figure 2. The registration was 
sought for three-dimensional puzzles. The mark was registered on 6 April 1999 and 
renewed on 10 November 2006.150 
 
Figure 2 The mark for which the registration was sought 
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Simba Toys filed a request for a declaration of invalidity, claiming that the trademark 
lacked distinctive character and was also purely functional. The request was denied 
by OHIM, even on appeal, so Simba Toys appealed to the GC.151 
In its appeal to the GC, Simba Toys put forward eight pleas in law. The relevant plea 
for the purposes of this thesis, is the second plea in law alleging infringement of 
Article 7(1)(e)(ii) of the Trademark Regulation, the non registrability of solely 
functional shapes.152 
First, the GC went over the principles established in Lego and found that the question 
must be answered in light of those principles.153 In accordance with Lego, firstly, the 
essential characteristics of a mark must be established. The essential characteristics 
of the mark where found to be the cubic structure – the cube itself – and the grid 
structure on each surface of the cube.154 Thus, the GC agreed with the Board of 
Appeals’ analysis of the essential characteristics and added that the additional 
shades of grey do not constitute essential characteristics of the mark.155 
I think that the fact that the registration was sought without involving any colours on 
the cube is of utmost importance. Since the Board of Appeals and the GC found the 
essential characteristics to be the black lines and the grid structure, the trademark 
granted is very wide. This leaves the trademark owner to use all possible colours and 
combinations of colours and still claim that this is the trademark they have registered. 
In all fairness, most likely even if the colours were used in the registration, these 
would have not been awarded protection. The combination of colours, however, 
could have. Nevertheless, the finding that the grid structure and black lines are the 
essential characteristics, gives the trademark a wider scope. 
Next, the GC turns to analyse the functionality of the elements. Simba Toys claimed 
that there is a correlation between the technical solution and the black lines.156 The 
black lines suggest that the smaller cubes can separate from each other and 
rotate.157 The GC found the claim to be unfounded since it is possible for a cube with 
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rotatable surfaces or other elements to not contain visible separating lines and thus 
there is no essential link between the spaces and the functionality.158 
In reaching its conclusion, the GC stressed that the applicant had taken into account 
its previous knowledge of the cube and that the rotating capability of the cube was 
not mentioned in the trademark application.159 According to the GC, an objective 
observer will not be able to define if the black lines afford the parts to rotate or to be 
taken apart to be reassembled. The rotating capability cannot be inferred from the 
black lines or the grid structure but from the internal mechanism which is not visible 
and thus cannot constitute an essential characteristic of the mark.160  
In answering the fourth part, the GC found that the claim of the technical function of 
the shapes in Philips was not directly apparent from the representation of the mark, 
was unfounded.161 The GC found that in Philips, the shaving function was clearly 
apparent from the graphic representation and the same was true in Lego, where the 
toy brick was looking to be registered in construction toys since it allowed for a logical 
conclusion that the studs were designed for the assembly and that the bricks 
contained hollow undersides even if the latter was not visible.162 However, in this 
case, it is not possible to infer a technical function or what it might be from the 
representation.163 
This is where the main difference with the previous cases lies. In Lego, the Grand 
Board of Appeal found that the most important element of the Lego brick is the two 
rows of studs on the upper surface.164 Based on the previous patents, the 
Cancellation Division had found that the purpose of these studs is to connect with the 
bottom of similar toy bricks so as to allow multiple assembly and disassembly.165 
Thus, in Lego, even the elements which were not a part of the trademark application 
were taken into account but were disregarded in Simba Toys. I think that it is very 
difficult, if not impossible, to infer functionality from the graphic representation of a 
shape. It is especially difficult to infer rotating or moving capabilities from the 
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graphical representation. Since the Philips case was a preliminary ruling, we do not 
know if the ECJ would have been able to infer the rotating capability from the graphic 
representation. If we were to follow Simba Toys, and not take into account the 
invisible elements, the Philips case should be decided differently. I fail to see how it is 
possible to infer the fact that the shaver heads rotate and are thus functional by just 
looking at the graphical representation of the trademark. The same holds true for the 
Lego brick. If the only aspect to be taken into consideration is the graphic 
representation, one cannot infer the interconnectivity with other building blocks by 
just looking at a Lego brick. 
I am also critical towards the GC statement that the previous knowledge should not 
be taken into account. This matter was not touched upon in Lego or Philips but if it 
were, I am fairly certain that it was the previous knowledge that led to the conclusion 
of functionality. If previous knowledge is not to be taken into account, the examiners 
should not have any or be able to disregard it. I am of the opinion that it is impossible 
to decide on something that you have previous knowledge of without taking the 
knowledge into account. Furthermore, it seems nearly impossible to me to find 
people qualified to act as examiners without previous knowledge of such everyday 
objects like the Lego brick or the Rubik’s cube. 
Another aspect which has not gotten a lot of attention is the fact that a trademark not 
only allows the owner to prevent others from using the same shape but also from 
using similar shapes. By virtue of this, a significant number of shapes might become 
unavailable.166 To me, the question in the Rubik’s cube-case is if the cubes with other 
dimensions, for example 4x4. 5x5, etc., are similar enough to the Rubik’s cube. What 
is more, the question whether in case of the shape being a polyhedron, the use could 
be prevented, is also unanswered. 
The Simba Toys case is not finally decided yet. The applicant has appealed to the 
ECJ and the appeal was registered on 27 January 2015, thus no further information 
is available.167 If the ECJ is to uphold the decision, this signifies a change in 
paradigm and makes it, if not a lot easier, then definitely easier for a functional shape 
to get registered as a trademark. Furthermore, it would clearly expand the scope of 
the overlap between trademark and patent law and would allow for prolonging of 
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patent rights. Thereby, article 7(e)(ii) of the Trademark Regulation would be deprived 
of most of its purpose. I am of the opinion that the ECJ should not uphold the 
decision and it should become one of the decisions where the GC erred. I am looking 
forward to the decision and hope that this case is important enough for the ECJ to 
involve an AG.168 
2.2.4. Yoshida 
The very recent judgment in Yoshida does not allow for definite conclusions on the 
Simba Toys case but is of interest since it concerns the registrability of functional 
shapes. Yoshida filed applications for trademarks to the OHIM for the figurative mark 
reproduced in figure 3.169 
 
 
Figure 3 The marks for which the registration was sought 
According to Yoshida, the trademark is a figurative mark. Upon a request for 
clarification, Yoshida specified the mark to be a “two-dimensional representation of 
the ‘shape of a product’, namely, the handle of a knife, or that it represented the 
‘design of knife handles’”.170 
The OHIM rejected the application on the ground that the mark was devoid of 
distinctive character.171 However, this decision was annulled and upon the 
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subsequent review, the examiner withdrew the objection and the trademarks were 
registered on 25 September 2002 and 16 April 2003.172 
On 10 July 2007, the interveners, Pi-design AG, Bodum France and Bodum Logistics 
A/S, lodged an application to revoke the trademarks on the grounds of the 
trademarks consist of shapes which are necessary for obtaining a technical result 
and additionally, are devoid of distinctive character.173 The applications were rejected 
and appealed to the Board of Appeal who upheld the appeals and annulled the 
previous decisions and revoked the trademarks.174. Unsatisfied with the result, 
Yoshida lodged an action for annulment to the GC. GC upheld the appeal but the 
decision was overturned by the ECJ and sent back to the GC for a decision.175  The 
case under analysis is the second case of the GC. 
The applicant, Yoshida, claims that the GC should annul the decisions and confirm 
the decision of the Cancellation Division which allowed the trademarks.176 Applicant 
relies on a single plea in law alleging the breach of Article 7(1)(e)(ii) of Trademark 
Regulation. The first part of the plea claims that the scope of the provision was 
misinterpreted. 177 
The first question the GC had to address was whether the ground for refusal set forth 
in article 7(1)(e)(ii) of the Trademark Regulation applies to figurative signs. The GC 
states that the wording of the article is broad and does not include a definition of what 
needs to be considered as shapes. Since the article does not differentiate between 
three-dimensional shapes, two-dimensional shapes or two-dimensional 
representations of three-dimensional shapes, the article applies to two-dimensional 
shapes.178 The GC based its final conclusion on the principles established in Philips 
and rejected this part of the plea. 179 
Secondly, the GC had to rule the nature of the signs. The applicant claims that it was 
not looking to register a shape mark but a figurative mark since the dots were 
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represented on a handle just to show how these were affixed to the product. 
According to the applicant, such sign cannot constitute a shape.180 GC restated the 
principle the ECJ had established that the essential characteristics of a shape must 
be identified while deciding on the registration and the principles of determining such 
characteristics.181 
The essential characteristics of the mark were found to be the trapezium shape and 
the array of dots.182 The GC ruled that the trapezium shape represents the shape of 
a handle of knives marketed by the applicant.183 Since the contours were not dot-
printed and there was no description of the positioning of the dots, the GC found that 
the shape was an essential character and not merely an illustration.184 It is clear that 
the GC, in line with the Philips and Lego cases, took more than the application into 
account.  
On the black dots, the GC found that these represent dents due to the fact that the 
dents were described in the American and European patents of the applicant. A 
further corroboration to the finding was the fact that the applicant did not dispute the 
dots being an important characteristic of the sign.185 Once again, the finding and the 
reliance on the patent applications supports the opinion of the Simba Toys being an 
anomaly. 
One of the arguments of the applicant was that the patent and the trademark were 
filed for simultaneously. According to Yoshida, this does not mean that the applicant 
was looking to extend the monopoly conferred by the patent. On the contrary, the 
applicant was looking to protect different aspects of its goods.186 The GC completely 
disregarded these arguments and simply held that the time of the filing of the 
application is of no relevance.187 I think that the GC’s ruling is in line with the refusal 
to register functional shapes. The only aspect the time of filing the application could 
prove, is the intent of the proprietor. However, the intent of the proprietor plays no 
part in the trademark registration procedure. 
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The applicant also claimed that the marks represent abstract and decorative 
geometric figures without a practical purpose and the dents are not necessary for the 
non-skid function.188 Once again, the GC relied on the previously established 
principles, this time the Lego ruling and the presumption of patents being evidence of 
functionality.189 It is evident from the patent applications that the patented invention is 
a knife with excellent durability, ease of use and weight balance. The GC ruled that 
the fact that the non-skid structure is not patentable or secondary is not relevant. The 
GC established that the refusal to register shapes necessary for a technical result 
does not only encompass the innovative technical result that may be patented but 
also the secondary characteristics. The dents are represented in the patents, thus 
they can be considered to be encompassed by the refusal.190 
The GC also found that the array of dents is aimed at obtaining a technical result. 
The non-skid nature of the applicant’s knives is due to the shape of the knives and 
the array of dents. The dots were black and monochromatic, hence devoid of any 
distinctive character, thus they could not be a non-functional element.191 
The applicant’s claim was rejected in its entirety. Yoshida has the possibility to 
appeal once more. However, based on the fact that this was already the second time 
the GC had to decide the case and the two GC’s decisions are different, I do not 
think that the appeal will be successful. Based on this case and the fact that there 
were references to both Lego and Philips, one can think that the ECJ is bound to 
overturn the Simba Toys. 
3. Competition aspects relating to registering patented 
subject matter as a trademark 
Since the ECJ has noted that registering patented subject-matter as a trademark 
may lead to competition concerns, it is only fitting to analyse if it does. The following 
chapter first explores the general landscape of competition law and then looks into if 
registering patented subject-matter as a trademark can lead to a competition law 
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infringement as it is or if competition law is only infringed by the subsequent actions 
of the proprietor. 
3.1. General remarks on competition law 
The Paris Convention article 10bis (2) states that any act of competition contrary to 
honest practices in industrial and commercial matters is considered unfair 
competition. 
Article 10bis (3) enlists three categories of cases that are prohibited, namely acts of 
such a nature as to create confusion, false allegations of such nature as to discredit a 
competitor and indications which are liable to mislead the public. Even though it is 
not expressly stated in the Paris Convention, it seems that the unfair competition 
provisions are concerned more with the consumer perspective and less with the 
perspective of competition.192 
On the EU level, the Union has also considered competition something worthy of 
protection. From the competition perspective, the TFEU contains provisions 
protecting competition. Consumer protection is a core value of the EU193 and in order 
to protect the consumer, the EU, amongst other legislative instruments, has adopted 
the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive.194 This thesis investigates if registering a 
patented subject matter as a trademark can constitute a competition law 
infringement, thus the question researched is if such registration is unfair 
competition. 
3.2 Competition law infringements 
TFEU sees three main ways to distort competition. Firstly, article 101 TFEU prohibits 
multilateral agreements between market participants with the possibility to affect 
trade and with the object of distorting competition. For the purposes of this thesis, 
this would mean that if there is competing shapes which both have been patented, 
the patent owners agree to both trademark their respective shapes. Due to the fact 
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that the patent must be new, there cannot be multiple patents for the same 
technology, even if they do differ in some details. Thus, the likelihood of such 
collusion is improbable, if not impossible. Even though the ECJ has on occasions 
found that conduct which seems to be unilateral can also fall foul of article 101 
TFEU195, the possibility of such a situation arising under these circumstances is 
unlikely since those cases concerned distribution agreements which are not the topic 
of this thesis. Therefore, article 101 TFEU will not be discussed further. 
Article 102 TFEU prohibits the abuse of a dominant position by one or more 
undertakings. Thus, article 102 TFEU prohibits both multilateral and unilateral 
abuses. For the purposes of this thesis, the unilateral abuse and the competitive 
advantage arising therefrom is the most likely. Hence, the focus of the thesis 
regarding unfair competition from the competitor’s and competition perspective will 
be on article 102 TFEU.  
Article 106 TFEU prohibits the disruption of competition by the State. Since the thesis 
is not concerned with the intervention of the state, this article will not be discussed 
further. I admit that the state may facilitate the registration of patented subject matter 
as trademarks with enacting legislation but researching this is not the aim of the 
thesis. 
Additionally, competition can be distorted by mergers. Analysing the possibilities of 
mergers distorting competition is not in the scope of this thesis since mergers require 
multilateral conduct and are the competition distortions are dependent on both 
parties. 
3.3. Article 102 perspective: abuse of dominance 
Article 102 TFEU prohibits abuse of a dominant position. The article lists some 
conducts that are considered to be an abuse of dominance. However, the list in the 
article is non-exhaustive, meaning that other conducts can also be seen as abuse of 
dominance.196 Thus, registering a patented technology as a trademark can, in 
principle, be classified as an abuse of a dominant position. 
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In order for a conduct to be classified as an abuse of a dominant position, two pre-
conditions need to be fulfilled. Firstly, there needs to be dominance and secondly, 
there needs to be abuse. 
To establish an infringement of article 102 TFEU, firstly, it needs to be determined if 
a firm is dominant. The ECJ established in United Brands that the dominant position 
referred to in article 102 TFEU relates to a position of economic strength enjoyed by 
an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on 
the relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent 
independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers.197 In 
Hoffman-La Roche, the ECJ added that dominance does not mean total absence of 
competition.198 
The definition presupposes a dominant supplier but the ECJ has also found the 
dominant position to exist from a buyer’s perspective.199 For the purposes of this 
thesis, it is the supplier perspective that is relevant. I do not think that the owner of 
the trademark which was subject to a patent could be in a position of a buyer, thus 
the supplier perspective will be the basis for the analysis. 
In Continental Can, the ECJ laid down the rule that the dominance must be 
established in relation to a particular market and not in the abstract. The definition of 
the relevant market is of essential significance.200 In practice, many different factors 
are taken into account and establishing the relevant market can prove to be 
difficult.201 
As has been stated before, the patent does not need to be used in order to be valid; 
the only requirement for a continued validity is that the fees are being paid.202 If the 
patent owner decides not to use the patent but still pay the fees and at one point 
register the patented subject matter as a trademark, there is a possibility of not being 
able to establish a relevant market. I am of the opinion that such a scenario is not 
very likely to occur since the overlap mostly regards shapes. Since shapes are 
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limited by laws of physics, those being revolutionary are unlikely and there will most 
likely be a substitute. Even if there is a market which did not exist before, there are 
still possibilities to establish dominance in such markets.203 
Thus, the premise of the thesis is that the relevant market could be established. Most 
likely, the relevant market for the product would be the market for products for which 
the trademark is used. As to the geographical sphere, it would most likely include the 
countries that the product is sold in. I do recognize that establishing the relevant 
market might prove to be difficult and in some cases can even lead to the ruling out 
of competition concerns completely. 
Historically it was believed that the existence of intellectual property rights meant 
having a monopoly. This was due to the fact that a monopoly was defined as an 
exclusive right and intellectual property rights are exclusive rights. Later on, the 
definition changed to generating social loss and thus the approach of intellectual 
property rights amounting to a monopoly and thereby dominance, was abandoned.204 
Nowadays, the analysis of whether the undertaking is dominant is done on a case by 
case basis, but there are some factors which signify dominance and have been 
accepted by the ECJ. For example, very large market shares raise a presumption of 
dominance.205 It must be noted, that it is just a presumption and can be rebutted in 
certain cases.206 Although there is no presumption that IP rights confer market 
power, they may however reinforce in EU competition law the inference of a 
dominant position if the undertaking also enjoys a high market share.207  
If the difficulties of establishing the relevant market are overcome, it should not be 
overly difficult to find that an undertaking which has registered patented subject 
matter as a trademark is dominant. Firstly, such registration presumes the existence 
of a registered patent. It is highly likely that the patent owner had to invest significant 
amounts of capital into R&D in the process of reaching a patent. Furthermore, the 
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fees for keeping the patent registered are not insignificant either. Thus, it is more 
than likely that the patent owner has put its patent to use. 
A possibility available to the patent owner is licensing the patent and not using it 
themselves. The choice whether or not to licence and the licensing conditions are the 
patent owner’s discretion. By giving multiple licenses, the monopoly and the 
dominance can be avoided. So a situation where the patent owner gives out multiple 
licenses before registering the patented subject matter as a trademark, in most cases 
precludes the establishment of dominance. It must be noted though that article 102 
TFEU does not only prohibit abuse of dominance by one undertaking but also applies 
to the situation of collective dominance.208 Hence, the possibility of multiple licenses 
does not completely rule out the possibility of a competition law infringement. In case 
of licencing and not using the patent themselves, the patent owner will not be in a 
dominant position but the licensees could be. However, it must be kept in mind that 
establishing collective dominance is a tougher task than establishing the dominance 
of one undertaking.209If the patent owner decides to license the patent but also use it 
themselves, the patent owner could also be found to be in a dominant position. The 
dominant position in such a scenario can also lead to an abuse under article 101 
TFEU. In conclusion, it can be said that even though the dominant position is more 
difficult to establish in cases of licensing the patent, it is not impossible. 
The obvious situation when a dominant position can be established is when the 
patent owner does not license the patent and is the sole user and thus supplier of the 
product. However, the finding of the patent owner to be in a dominant position differs 
depending on when the trademark is filed for. 
If the trademark is filed for simultaneously or shortly after applying for the patent, the 
finding of dominance is difficult. In such a case, the patent owner has not gained 
market power and the dominance is not as easily established. Since the appreciation 
of a dominant position is dependent on many factors210, it is possible for an 
undertaking to become dominant over time or lose its dominance. Thus, even though 
in such a scenario it is difficult to be in a dominant position at the beginning, this does 
not mean that the dominance is impossible. The dominant position is more easily 
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established if the patent owner files for a trademark after establishing themselves in 
the market. 
In conclusion, it is possible for an undertaking which registers patented subject 
matter as a trademark, to fulfil the dominance criterion of article 102 TFEU. However, 
establishing dominance requires also establishing the relevant market which might 
prove to be difficult. The conclusion for the purposes of this thesis is, that it is 
possible to fulfil the criterion of dominance in case of registering patented subject 
matter as a trademark. 
3.4 Registration is an abuse in itself 
There is no definition of what the abuse under article 102 TFEU entails. The list in the 
article is non-exhaustive, meaning that other conducts can also be seen as abuse of 
dominance.211 Thus, registering a patented technology as a trademark can be 
classified as an abuse of dominant position even if it fits none of the categories listed 
in article 102 TFEU. It is worthy of analysis if registering patented subject matter as a 
trademark is an abuse in itself or if it fits one of the existing categories listed in article 
102 TFEU. 
3.4.1. Existence and exercise of intellectual property rights 
In order to avoid the division of the internal market on the national boundaries, the 
ECJ has adopted a doctrine of EU wide exhaustion, under which the IPR:s are 
exhausted if the owner markets the good or has consented to someone else doing 
so, the IPR:s are exhausted and cannot be used to control the sales.212 An IPR will 
give their owner absolute power in the protected product or service, however, the 
product or service will very rarely be the only one available on the relevant market.213 
In Consten and Grundig, the ECJ took a step further and distinguished between the 
existence and exercise of the IPR:s. The existence, meaning the ownership of the 
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IPR:s, falls under article 345 TFEU and is thus a matter of national law. The exercise, 
however, is fully governed by the Treaty provisions and is an EU matter.214 
In Sirena Srl v Eda Srl, the ECJ held that a trademark as a legal entity does not fulfil 
the prerequisites to fall under the prohibition stated in what is now article 101 TFEU. 
However, the exercise of that right might fall within the prohibition but this must be 
established on a case by case analysis.215 
The ECJ stated clearly its views as to IPR:s and article 102 TFEU abuses in the 
Magill case.216 The ECJ explicitly ruled that the mere ownership of an intellectual 
property right cannot confer a dominant position.217 However, the right can be 
potentially exercised in an abusive way.218 Later on, this dichotomy has been used by 
the parties to the proceedings and also the ECJ.219 
The distinction between the existence and exercise of an IP right is based on the 
‘specific subject matter’ of the IP right. Use of an IP right in a manner which ensures 
for the right holder the benefit of the specific subject matter of that right is regarded 
as preserving the existence of the right and cannot in principle be overruled by the 
free movement or competition provisions of the Treaty. Use of an IP right in a manner 
which goes beyond the specific subject matter of the right is regarded as being an 
exercise of that right which must be analysed in light of the free movement and/or 
competition provisions of the Treaty. Once the IP owner has received the benefit of 
the specific subject matter of the IP right, the right is said to be ‘exhausted’.220 
The specific subject matter of a patent is to ensure to the holder the exclusive right to 
utilise an invention with a view to manufacture and first put into circulation industrial 
products and oppose any third party infringement. Trademarks under EU law are 
there to ensure to the holder the exclusive right to utilise the mark for the first putting 
into circulation of a product, and thus to protect him against competitors who would 
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take advantage of the position and reputation of the mark by selling goods improperly 
bearing that mark.221 
Valentine Korah is of the opinion that it is impossible to draw a line between the 
existence and exercise of IPR-s in legal theory. The division can only be made at the 
extremes since existence comprises all the ways in which the right could be 
exercised.222 
I agree with professor Korah. The dichotomy is mostly unnecessary since there is not 
much value in the mere ownership of IPR:s without the possibility to exercise them. 
The specific subject matter approach does not really distinguish between the 
existence and exercise of IPR:s. By definition, the specific subject matter also involve 
some sort of exercise of the rights, it is not only concerned with the existence thereof. 
In case of trademarks, the dichotomy seems to be even more devoid of substance. 
As has been repeated in the first part of the thesis, trademarks require use in order to 
be valid. Hence, it is not possible to own a trademark and not use it. However, as can 
be seen from the legislation, there is a grace period where a proprietor could hold a 
trademark without using it. Admittedly, the validity or invalidity of the non-used 
trademark is dependent on third persons. 
I admit that the “use” of a trademark may entail more than one course of action. 
However, I am not able to think of a use which would be possible under the 
circumstances of registering patented subject-matter as trademarks. 
The dependency on third persons is sufficient to guarantee the entrance of the 
subject matter to the public domain. It is important to note that in order to invalidate a 
trademark which has not been used, no specific interest in invalidation needs to be 
shown nor any reasons given. Thus, if the trademark is not used, there are wide 
possibilities to seek its invalidation. The trademark needs to fulfil all the criteria 
necessary for a trademark registration but not all trademarks are of the same quality. 
If the trademark is highly distinctive or can be used for many products, it is more 
likely that somebody files for invalidation. 
The foregoing is even truer in cases concerned with registering patented subject 
matter as a trademark. The subject matter is valuable and the competitors are 
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interested in it entering the public domain. Thus, I am certain that in such a case, the 
competitors are very active in invalidating the trademark and it is difficult if not 
impossible to keep such a trademark without exercising it. 
On the other hand, considering that the ECJ has also divided the competences 
between the national and EU law following the dichotomy between existence and 
exercise,223 the dichotomy cannot be completely disregarded. However, since 
intellectual property law is becoming more and more harmonised, the dichotomy 
becomes less relevant. The more extensive harmonisation leads to more questions 
on interpretation and leads to possibilities for the ECJ to get involved. The 
competence to regulate the existence and the exercise still remains but it will not 
have a lot of substance. The EU will not have the competence to interfere but if the 
existence is a national matter and since there is not much value in the existence, I do 
not see a great importance. 
To conclude, the dichotomy between exercise and existence of IPR-s is artificial to 
say the least and mostly unnecessary. In case of a patented subject matter 
registered as a trademark, the dichotomy plays no part since there cannot be a 
trademark right without the exercise of such a right. Due to the grace period, the 
competition law infringement could still be only in the existence of the IPR or through 
its exercise. I call the infringements that occur due to the existence abuses in the 
registration itself and the infringements occurring due to the exercise of the IPR:s 
follow-on abuses. 
3.4.2. The different types of abuses 
In Commercial Solvents, the ECJ established a distinction between what are now 
called exploitative and exclusionary abuses.224 An ‘exclusionary abuse’ is a conduct 
which is likely to lead to the effect of eliminating, weakening or marginalising effective 
competition on the relevant market. This could mean forcing out or marginalising 
existing competitors or raising barriers to entry for potential new competitors. 
Predatory, below-cost, pricing which is explicable only by the desire to eliminate a 
                                                          
223
 Korah (n 214), pg 3. 
224
 Joined cases 6/73 and 7/73 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial Solvents v 
Commission [1974] ECR 00223. 
50 
 
competitor from the market is an example of an exclusionary abuse.225 As is the case 
for most of competition law, the list226 is not exhaustive. 
An ‘exploitative abuse’ is a conduct which is unfair or unreasonable towards those 
persons who depend on the dominant firm for the supply of goods or services on the 
relevant market. Excessive prices, which bear no reasonable relation to the 
economic value of the product supplied, are an example of an exploitative abuse. Of 
these two categories, the first is the more important in practice and reflects the 
increasing focus on the wider economic effect of conduct alleged to be abusive.227 
It is also possible to distinct a third category of discriminatory abuses. Discriminatory 
abuses are abuses in which competition is harmed by discriminatory prices or trading 
conditions charged or applied by the dominant undertaking on an intermediate 
market with the effect of placing certain suppliers or customers of the dominant 
undertaking at a ‘competitive disadvantage’. According to some economists, 
discriminatory abuses may also be classified as exploitative abuses since they also 
result in direct harm to consumers.228 
For this thesis, the division into exploitative and exclusionary abuses is used. I think 
that the distinction into three categories is a bit artificial and unnecessary, since 
possible discriminatory abuses are covered by the two types and add nothing further 
to it. From a practical perspective, it does not matter if and how the abuse is 
classified since the fact that it constitutes an abuse still remains and this is the 
important part for finding the abuse of dominance. 
As to the registration of patented subject matter, it could fall under either one of the 
categories. The registration can constitute an exclusionary abuse since it makes it 
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more difficult, if not impossible, for other players to enter the market. If the product is 
protected by a trademark, other undertakings need to obtain a license for it, thus 
there are barriers to entry to the market. This in itself can be seen as an exclusionary 
abuse. 
Simultaneously, the registration can constitute an exploitative abuse. In the end; it is 
the consumer who will suffer due to the lack of sufficient competition. There would 
not be sufficient competition since the product is under the control of the trademark 
owner and the competition on the market would not be free but heavily influenced by 
the trademark owner. 
Misuse of intellectual property rights can be classified as an exploitative abuse.229 
Registering patented subject matter as a trademark can certainly be classified as 
misuse or even abuse of intellectual property rights since the different types of 
intellectual property rights are meant to protect different aspects and should not 
overlap to such an extent to allow misuse. 
3.4.3. Registration as the abuse listed in article 102(b) TFEU 
Article 102(b) TFEU provides that an abuse may consist in limiting production, 
markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers. This abuse listed in 
article 102(b) TFEU differs from the others since this abuse can occur in a situation 
where patented subject matter is covered by a trademark without involving any other 
actions on part of the proprietor, on the so-called existence level of the dichotomy. 
Conduct falling within that category could include limitation by a dominant 
undertaking of its own output or action on the part of a dominant undertaking that 
limits the ability of third parties to increase production or enter new markets or 
develop new techniques.230 
In case of registering a patented subject matter as a trademark, there is a limitation 
to enter the market. First of all, in a scenario where the proprietor does not make use 
of its intellectual property, there is a barrier to entry if it is impossible to enter the 
market circumventing the proprietor. This barrier is also impossible to remove since 
there is a prohibition of compulsory licensing. I do not see a possibility of a shape 
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being so vital that the exception implied by article 40 of the TRIPS Agreement would 
be applicable. 
Even if it is licensed in a way that the trademark owner is not the only one in the 
market, new entrants are required to obtain the license in order to enter the market. 
This fulfils the criteria of barriers to entry and allows for classification of such conduct 
as the abuse listed in article 102(b) TFEU. Such a situation can also give rise to the 
infringement of article 101 TFEU but since article 101 TFEU is outside of the scope 
of this thesis, these possibilities are not explored further. 
For such an abuse, there also needs to be a detriment to the consumer. It has been 
argued that the consumer harm required under article 102(b) TFEU is an enhanced 
form of consumer detriment over and above a mere restriction of output, markets or 
innovation. Thus, the consumer harm test under article 102(b) TFEU may consist in a 
specific form thereof, such as the prevention of the emergence of a new or 
differentiated product.231 
The higher burden of consumer harm is met in the case of registering patented 
subject matter as a trademark. If it is impossible to enter the market without the 
proprietor’s consent and if the proprietor decides not to enter the market, the 
consumer is deprived of a possibly beneficial product. In case the proprietor is the 
sole supplier on the market, the consumer’s choice is limited and the price will most 
likely be higher. It is questionable, if the higher price and the limited choice are 
sufficient to meet the burden since these are inevitable in case of competition law 
infringements. 
On the other hand, one could say that the second part of the clause is not fulfilled, 
imposing no detriment to the consumers. If the trademark owner is not the only one 
in the market, there is presumably sufficient competition to ensure that there can be 
no abuse. The detriment to the consumer can also be avoided if there simply is no 
possibility of follow-on innovation or related products. This, however, seems to be 
unlikely to me. What is more, the new entrants and the stiffer competition might not 
lead to a consumer benefit, thus the detrimental effects might not be done away with 
in case of competition. 
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In conclusion, it is certain that registering patented subject matter as a trademark can 
constitute an infringement of competition law even if there is little to no action on part 
of the proprietor. 
3.4.4. Conclusion 
It can be inferred from the aforementioned that the registration in itself can constitute 
an abuse. Since there cannot be a division into existence and exercise of trademark 
rights, the existence of a trademark right implies the exercise and thus an abuse. The 
abuse can be seen both as exclusionary and exploitative but this does not make a 
difference in practice since it is the fact of abuse and not the classification thereof 
which is the deciding factor. It is also possible for the registration to constitute the 
abuse listed in article 102(b) TFEU. 
3.5. Follow-on abuses 
The previous section was concerned with the abuses committed by the mere 
existence of such a registration. Now, the analysis turns to the exercise of the 
intellectual property rights and looks at which abuses can occur if the trademark right 
is exercised. These differ from the previous abuses since they are dependent on 
more than just the registration. 
The intent of the proprietor plays a crucial part in establishing the likelihood of such 
an abuse. Firstly, a proprietor who is looking to trademark patented subject matter is, 
in essence, trying to prolong its rights. This shows that the proprietor is prone to 
abuses. By prolonging the monopoly rights, the proprietor also retains the right to 
independent pricing policy. In such a scenario, it is likely that the proprietor’s prices 
are higher than in a competitive situation. 
3.5.1. Abuse specified in article 102(a) TFEU 
Article 102(a) TFEU is concerned with unfair prices and other trading conditions. 
Pricing below the cost to force out a competitor, also known as predatory pricing is a 
type of unfair pricing.232 It has been argued that predatory prices do not exploit the 
customers and a failed attempt at predation does not harm the customers but 
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benefits them.233 In case of a patented subject matter being registered as a 
trademark, I do not see how predatory pricing can occur since predatory pricing is 
undertaken with the view to force out competitors. However, in a situation where 
patented subject matter is registered as a trademark, the proprietor is either the sole 
supplier on the market or the licensor to the others. Thus, if the proprietor wants to 
eliminate competition, the easier way would be to revoke the license or to raise the 
price of the license. Raising the price of the license might as well be classified as an 
unfair trading condition. In case of revoking the license, the conduct could be seen as 
a refusal to supply.234 Hence, the other ways to get rid of the competitors are not free 
from competition concerns but I think that those are easier to take on for the 
proprietor and thus I do not see a need to be involved in the conduct which can be 
seen as predatory pricing. 
On the other hand, the unfair pricing in the sense that the price charged is excessive, 
is more likely to occur. It has been argued that an excessive price is a price set by a 
dominant undertaking excessively above the competitive level in order to exploit its 
customers.235 However, the consumer harm is not foreseen in the text of article 
102(a) TFEU unlike in article 102(b) TFEU. To me, it seems that this signifies that by 
article 102(a) TFEU, the legislator wanted to capture the predatory pricing as well 
and when consumer harm is prescribed, this would not be so. It is also unnecessary 
to establish the consumer harm to a higher standard as it is with article 102(b) TFEU. 
However, the unfairness of the prices still needs to be established. The ECJ and the 
Commission have used several benchmarks in relation to which to compare the 
prices. These include the costs of the dominant undertaking, prices charged by the 
dominant undertaking on other markets, the prices of competitors’ products on the 
market and the prices of competitors’ similar products on other markets.236 To me, it 
seems difficult to establish the unfairness against these benchmarks. 
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The only real comparison could be made with the costs of the undertaking. In such 
an evaluation, no benchmarking is needed. It implies that in some cases the abusive 
nature of a price is self-evident vis-à-vis its high profit margin.237 However, while an 
excessive price margin may be in theory self-evident, it is difficult to prove in 
practice.238 I think that it is impossible to establish a level which can be seen as an 
excessive price margin in every case. Furthermore, establishing some price margin 
as excessive in itself can constitute an infringement of the freedom to conduct a 
business.239 
It has been argued that one of the possibilities to establish the excessiveness of a 
price margin and the abusiveness of the prices is to compare the prices to the past 
prices of the same product.240 However, this comparison prescribes a change in the 
price. If the price of the product remains unchanged, this comparison is meaningless 
and thus in reality, abusive prices could be charged. I think that in case of a patented 
subject matter being registered as a trademark, there would not be a change in the 
pricing of a product after registering the trademark. Thus this benchmark would be 
inutile. 
The prices charged by the dominant undertaking on other markets can only be a 
meaningful benchmark if there is another market. In the absence of such a market, 
the comparison cannot be conducted. By other market in this sense is meant the 
upstream or the downstream market and not just any market where the undertaking 
is active. 
The prices of competitors’ products cannot be a benchmark in such a case. Since the 
trademark rights give a monopoly to the proprietor, there cannot be any competitors’ 
against whose prices to conduct the comparison. In case of the proprietor granting 
licenses, I think that this still proves to be inefficient. The proprietor is indirectly in 
control of the competitors’ prices due to the licensing relationship. Thus, the prices of 
the competitors cannot differ greatly from the one of the dominant undertaking. 
Hence, no meaningful conclusion can be drawn. For the same reason, the prices of 
competitors’ on other markets are not suitable for comparison. 
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In conclusion, it is possible for the following conduct of the trademark proprietor to 
constitute an abuse specified in article 102(a) TFEU. However, establishing the 
conduct as such abuse might prove to be difficult since it is dependent on many 
factors and an in-depth analysis. 
3.5.2. Abuse specified in article 102(b) TFEU 
Article 102(b) TFEU abuse does not only occur on the existence level. As has been 
established before, revoking the license could fall under this title. Furthermore, the 
ECJ has found in Continental Can, that the acquisition of a competitor by a dominant 
firm may constitute an abuse through its impact on the competitive market 
structure.241 Revoking a license also influences the market structure as do the 
proprietor’s choice of licensees. 
It needs to be noted that the higher consumer harm standard applies in these cases. 
I think that in case of influencing the market structure, the consumer harm standard is 
met since the consumer’s choice is limited which is detrimental to the consumer. A 
limited choice would most likely lead to increasing prices so the burden is met in any 
case. 
3.5.3. Abuse specified in article 102(c) and (d) TFEU 
Article 102(c) TFEU is concerned with the discrimination between the customers of 
the undertaking. The most likely discrimination to occur is price discrimination. Price 
discrimination is the practice of selling the same product to different buyers at 
different prices, in circumstances where the price differential is not justified by cost 
differences.242 However, this is completely dependent on the actions of the 
proprietor, thus this abuse might occur but might as well not. I think that this is a class 
of abuses which can occur in any case, hence there is no need to analyse this 
possibility further and it suffices to conclude that the possibility exists. 
Article 102(d) TFEU concerns a situation where the conclusion of contracts is made 
subject to acceptance by other parties of unconnected obligations. As it is with the 
discrimination abuses listed in article 102(c) TFEU, these types of abuses can occur 
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in all types of cases and thus no further analysis from the perspective of registering 
patent-protected subject matter as a trademark is needed. 
3.5.4. Conclusion 
In conclusion, it can be said that there is a wide possibility of follow-on abuses. Since 
the list in article 102 TFEU is non-exhaustive, other abuses may occur as well which 
cannot be classified under any of the example categories. There is a definite threat to 
competition in case of registering patented subject matter as a trademark. However, 
the follow-on abuses are completely dependent on the actions of the trademark 
proprietor. Thus, it cannot be said that these will occur in any case. 
4. Final conclusions 
In an ideal world, relevant legislation would be sufficient to avoid the overlaps of 
different intellectual property rights. However, the legislation and the world we live in 
is less than ideal. This thesis set out to establish if registering patented subject 
matter as a trademark is a competition law infringement or an allowed use of 
intellectual property law. 
According to the relevant legislation, there is a possibility of overlapping intellectual 
property rights and for one object to be protected by multiple intellectual property 
rights. Thus, from the intellectual property perspective, it seems that the registration 
possibility is an allowed use of intellectual property law. 
The case law supports the position that the overlap between patents and trademarks 
is narrow. In the Philips, Lego and Yoshida cases, the registration was denied based 
on the fact that the shapes were functional. The Simba Toys case in the GC has 
ended up with a somewhat surprising conclusion of the Rubik’s cube being 
registerable as a trademark. If the ruling in Simba Toys is to be upheld, this means 
that the overlap is greater than the ECJ had established in its previous case law. I 
think that this would also lead to a change in approach to the evaluation of 
functionality. However, the ruling in Yoshida which is more recent than the Simba 
Toys, signifies that the ECJ’s approach has not changed and the principles and 
approaches established in Philips and Lego are still valid. 
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As to competition law infringements, such registration is capable of constituting a 
competition law infringement. Article 102 TFEU lists some exemplary infringements 
but the list is non-exhaustive. The registration can be classified as both exclusionary 
and exploitative abuse. This thesis operated with a presumption that the relevant 
market can be established, however, the difficulties of doing so are acknowledged. It 
is possible for a proprietor who has registered patent-protected subject matter as a 
trademark to be in a dominant position. The dominance is more easily established if 
the patent registration and the trademark registration are not done simultaneously. 
However, since the markets and the positions on markets are changing, the 
dominance can also be found in other scenarios. As always, it is subject to certain 
conditions. 
There is a dichotomy between the existence and the exercise of intellectual property 
rights in the ECJ case law. I find that the dichotomy is not that useful and for 
trademarks should be done away with since there is no meaning in an existing 
trademark right without the exercise thereof. A further support to this position is found 
in the fact that trademarks require use to be valid. 
Due to the dichotomy, the possibility of the existence of a trademark right constituting 
a competition law infringement was analysed. Since there cannot be a division into 
existence and exercise of trademark rights, the existence of a trademark right implies 
the exercise and therefore may constitute an abuse. The theoretical classification of 
the abuse does not play a role if the abuse is established. Furthermore, the existence 
of the trademark right can also constitute an abuse listed in article 102(b) TFEU. 
When it comes to the exercise of the intellectual property rights, all of the listed 
abuses in article 102 TFEU can occur and even those which are not listed. It is 
particularly likely that the excessive pricing abuse occurs. However, there are 
significant difficulties in establishing the excessiveness of the price. The abuses on 
the exercise level of IPR:s are not inevitable but dependent on the actions of the 
proprietor. 
Finally, I am of the opinion that the registration should be a theoretical possibility to 
use intellectual property law. As the case law of the ECJ stands today, the overlap is 
not completely eliminated but it is very narrow. I think that this is how it has to be. 
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Patents allow for a very extensive protection for a limited time, hence I think that the 
patent proprietor should be able to reap the reward in the time of the extensive 
protection. Protecting an invention with a trademark would lead to an unfair 
advantage to the proprietor. 
I find that overlapping intellectual property rights provide for an interesting research 
subject. This overlap was particularly interesting to me since it is quite unlikely but 
when executed, it provides for obvious restraint on competition. I am looking forward 
to ECJ’s decision in the Simba Toys case and the subsequent changes in the overlap 
between patents and trademarks if there are going to be any. 
  
60 
 
List of references 
Books 
Akman, P, The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition Law: Law and Economic 
Approaches (Hart Publishing 2012) 
Cornish, W; Llewelyn, D; Aplin, T, Intellectual property: patents, copyright, trade 
marks and allied rights 8th edition (Sweet & Maxwell 2013) 
Cottier, T; Veron, P, Concise International and European IP Law. TRIPS, Paris 
Convention, European Enforcement and Transfer of Technology 3rd edition (Kluwer 
Law International 2014) 
Davis, R; Longstaff, B; Roughton, A, St Quintin T, Tritton, G, Intellectual Property in 
Europe 4th edition (Sweet & Maxwell 2014) 
Derclaye, E; Leistner, M, Intellectual Property Overlaps A European Perspective 
(Hart Publishing 2011) 
Faull, J; Nikpay, A (editors), The EU Law of Competition 3rd edition (Oxford University 
Press 2014) 
Korah, V, Intellectual Property Rights and the EC Competition Rules (Hart Publishing 
2006) 
Lidgard, H H, Competition Classics (Maria Magle Publishing, 2011) 
Muir, I; Brandi-Dohrn, M; Gruber, S, European Patent Law. Law and Procedure 
under the EPC and PCT 2nd edition (Oxford University Press, 2003) 
Nazzini, R, The Foundations of European Union Competition Law The Objective and 
Principles of Article 102 1st edition (Oxford University Press 2012) 
Rose, V; Bailey, D (editors), Bellamy and Child: European Union Law of Competition 
7th edition (Oxford University Press 2013) 
Sufrin, A; Jones, B, EU competition law: text, cases & materials 5th edition (Oxford 
University Press 2014) 
Whish, R; Bailey, D, Competition Law 7th edition (Oxford University Press 2012) 
  
61 
 
Articles 
Chapman, S, Trade marks for functional shapes: Comment on Philips v Remington 
(C-299/99), European Intellectual Property Law, the european legal forum, issue 5-
2002), available at http://www.simons-law.com/library/pdf/e/332.pdf  
Hou, L, Excessive Prices within EU Competition Law (European Competition Journal, 
Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 47-70, 2011), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1850569 
(03.05.2015) 
Rejss, S M, Commentary on the Paris Convention for the protection of industrial 
property, available at http://www.lex-ip.com/Paris.pdf (03.05.2015) 
Senftleben, M, Bringing EU Trademark Protection Back Into Shape – Lessons to 
Learn From Keyword Advertising (Vrije University Amsterdam), available at 
http://www.epip.eu/conferences/epip06/papers/Parallel%20Session%20Papers/SEN
FTLEBEN%20Martin.pdf (27.04.2015) 
Ullrich, H, Harmonizing Patent Law: The Untamable Union Patent (March 22, 2012). 
HARMONISATION OF EUROPEAN IP LAW: FROM EUROPEAN RULES TO 
BELGIAN LAW AND PRACTICE, M.-Chr. Janssens, G. Van Overwalle, eds., 
Brussels (Bruylant) 2012, Forthcoming; Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property 
& Competition Law Research Paper No. 12-03. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2027920 (28.04.2015) 
Case law 
European Court of Justice 
Case 40/70 Sirena v Eda [1971] ECR 00069 
Case 6/72 Europemballage and Continental Can v Commission [1973] ECR 215, 
[1973] CMLR 199 
Joined cases 6/73 and 7/73 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial 
Solvents v Commission [1974] ECR 00223 
Case 27/76 United Brands Continental BV v. Commission [1978] ECR 207 
62 
 
Case 85/76 Hoffman-La Roche & Co AG v Commission [1979] ECR 00461 
Joined Cases 25/64 and 26/84Ford v Commission [1985] ECR 02725 
Case C-277/87 Sandoz Prodotti Farmaceutici v Commission [1990] ECR I-00045 
Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission [1991] ECR I-03359 
Case C-241/91 P RTE and ITP v Commission [1995] ECR I-00743 
Case C-109/97 Windsurfing Chiemsee [1999] ECR I-2779 
Joined cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P Compagnie Maritime Beige Transports SA, 
Compagnie Maritime Belge SA and Dafra-Lines A/S v Commission [2000] ECR I-
1365 
Case C-273/00 Ralf Sieckmann v. Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt [2002] ECR I-
11737 
Case C-299/99 Philips [2002] ECR I-05475 
Case C-40/01 Ansul [2003] ECR I-02439 
Case C-418/01 IMS Health [2004] ECR I-05039 
Case C-48/09 P Lego Juris v OHIM [2010] ECR I-08403 
Case C-457/10 P AstraZeneca v Commisson [published in the electronic Reports of 
Cases] 
Joined cases C-217/13 and C-218/13 Oberbank and Others (Third Chamber, 19 
June 2014) 
Case C-30/15 P Simba Toys v OHIM [n.y.r] 
Case C-146/13 Spain v Parliament and Council [n.y.r] 
Case C-147/13 Spain v Council [n.y.r], 
General Court 
Case T-450/09 Simba Toys v OHIM [General Court, 25 November 2014] 
63 
 
Joined Cases T-331/10 RENV and T-416/10 RENV Yoshida Metal Industry v OHIM 
[General Court, 21 May 2015]. 
Opinions of Advocate Generals 
Case C-299/99 Philips [2002] ECR I-05475, Opinion of AG Colomer 
Case C-48/09 P Lego Juris v OHIM [2010] ECR I-08403, Opinion of AG Mengozzi 
Case C-146/13 Spain v Parliament and Council [n.y.r], Opinion of AG Bot 
Case C-147/13 Spain v Council [n.y.r], Opinion of AG Bot 
Opinion of ECJ 
Opinion of the Court (Full Court) 1/09 [2011] ECR I-01137 
Treaties, charters, international agreements 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
European Patent Convention 
Paris Convention  
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [TFEU], Consolidated Version 
[2012] OJ C 326/88102 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2010] OJ C 83/02 
Decisions from OHIM and EPO 
Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office, Decision T 1081/01 27.09.2004 
Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office, Decision T 0024/81 13.10.1982 
Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office, Decision T 0870/04 11.05.2005 
OHIM Decision of the Second Board of Appeal, 11.02.1999, in Case R 156/1998-2 
OHIM Cancellation Division, 30.7.2004, in Case 63 C 107029/1 Mega Bloks v. Kirkbi. 
OHIM Grand Board of Appeal, 10.7.2006, in Case R 856/2004-G Lego. 
Secondary legislation 
Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (OJ L 024 , 29/01/2004) 
64 
 
Council Regulation (EC) no 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade 
mark OJ L 78/1 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/92 of 18 June 1992 concerning the creation of a 
supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products OJ L 182 
Council Regulation (EU) No 1260/2012 of 17 December 2012 implementing 
enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection with 
regard to the applicable translation arrangements (OJ L 361) 
Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 
concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market 
and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 
2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 
2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council OJ L 149/22 
Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2006 on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights OJ L 
372 
Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 
2008 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade mark OJ L 
299/5 
Directive 98/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 
1998 on the legal protection of designs OJ L 289 
Regulation (EC) No 1610/96 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
July 1996 concerning the creation of a supplementary protection certificate for plant 
protection products OJ L 198 
Regulation (EC) no 1901/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2006 on medicinal products for paediatric use and amending Regulation 
(EEC) No 1768/92, Directive 2001/20/EC, Directive 2001/83/EC and Regulation (EC) 
No 726/2004 OJ L 378/1 
Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
December 2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of 
unitary patent protection (OJ L 361) 
  
65 
 
Other material 
Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (draft available at http://www.unified-patent-
court.org/images/documents/upc-agreement.pdf (04.05.2015) 
Code de la propriété intellectuelle available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006069414 
(04.05.2015) 
EPO’s FAQ:s,: http://www.epo.org/service-support/faq/own-file.html#faq-274 
(26.05.2015) 
Kasuliku mudeli seadus (Utility Models Act) available at 
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/523122014001/consolide (04.05.2015).  
Kluwer Patent Blog, Italy wants to join the Unitary Patent (Kluwer Patent Blog, 
14.05.2015) available at: http://kluwerpatentblog.com/2015/05/14/italy-wants-to-join-
the-unitary-patent/ (19.05.2015) 
Lianos, I, Dreyfuss, R C, New Challenges in the Intersection of Intellectual Property 
Rights with Competition Law - A View from Europe and the United States (CLES 
Working Paper Series 4/2013, 2013) available at https://www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/research-
paper-series/index/edit/research-papers/cles-4-2013 (04.05.2015) 
List of contracting parties to the Paris Convention, available at: 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=2 (26.05.2015). 
List of signatories to the TRIPS Agreement, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/parties.jsp?treaty_id=231&group_id=22 
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/intellectual-property/industrial-
property/patent/faqs/index_en.htm (04.05.2015) 
List of the Member States and their ratification, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/agreements-
conventions/agreement/?aid=2013001 (28.04.2015) 
Member states of the European Patent Organisation, available at 
http://www.epo.org/about-us/organisation/member-states.html (04.05.2015). 
Monti, M, The New EU Policy on Technology Transfer Agreements (Speech held at 
Ecole des Mines, Paris, 16.01.2004) available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-04-19_en.htm?locale=en (28.04.2015) 
66 
 
Phillips, J, IP proverbs competition: the winner! (IPKat, 17.01.2010) available at 
http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2010/01/ip-proverbs-competition-winner.html 
(28.04.2015) 
Phillips, J, After Spain loses, Italy falls into line: unitary patent package edges closer 
(IPKat, 15.05.2015), available at: http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2015/05/after-spain-
loses-italy-falls-into-line.html (19.05.2015). 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
patentability of computer-implemented inventions (Commission proposal COM(2002) 
92) OJ C 151E 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council to 
approximate the laws of the member states relating to trade marks (recast) 
(com/2013/0162 final - 2013/0089 (COD)) 
Rosati, E, CJEU publishes its 2014 Report: more and more cases, fewer and fewer 
AG Opinions? (IPKat, 20.04.2015) available at 
http://ipkitten.blogspot.co.uk/2015/04/cjeu-publishes-its-2014-report-more-and.html 
(04.05.2015) 
 
